Industry concentration measures calculated with Compustat data, which cover only the public firms in an industry, are poor proxies for actual industry concentration. These measures have correlations of only 13% with the corresponding U.S. Census measures, which are based on all public and private firms in an industry. Also, only when U.S. Census measures are used is there evidence consistent with theoretical predictions that moreconcentrated industries, which should be more oligopolistic, are populated by larger and fewer firms with higher price-cost margins. Further, the significant relations of Compustatbased industry concentration measures with the dependent variables of several important prior studies are not obtained when U.S. Census measures are used. One of the reasons for this occurrence is that Compustat-based measures proxy for industry decline. Overall, our results indicate that product markets research that uses Compustat-based industry concentration measures may lead to incorrect conclusions. (JEL G10, G30, L10) A growing number of studies that consider the effects of product markets on financial economics-related phenomena use industry concentration measures calculated with Compustat data, which cover only the public firms in an industry. These studies examine issues related to asset pricing (Hou and Robinson
A growing number of studies that consider the effects of product markets on financial economics-related phenomena use industry concentration measures calculated with Compustat data, which cover only the public firms in an industry. These studies examine issues related to asset pricing (Hou and Robinson 2006) , informed trading (Tookes 2008) , idiosyncratic stock return volatility (Gaspar and Massa 2006) , mergers and acquisitions (Song and Walkling 2000; Fee and Thomas 2004; Shahrur 2005) , corporate governance (DeFond and Park 1999; Engel, Hayes, and Wang 2003; Rennie 2006; Karuna 2007) , capital structure (Lang and Stulz 1992; Kale and Shahrur 2007) , corporate disclosure policy (Harris 1998; Botosan and Harris 2000; Botosan and Stanford 2005; Rogers and Stocken 2005; Verrecchia and Weber 2006) , income-increasing accounting choices (Zmijewski and Hagerman 1981) , and the determinants of corporate earnings (Cheng 2005) .
We consider the empirical implications of using industry concentration measures that are based on only a firm's publicly traded rivals. To do so, we compare Compustat-based industry concentration measures with industry concentration measures collected from 1963-2002 Census of Manufactures publications provided by the U.S. Census Bureau, which are based on all public and private firms in an industry. The Census of Manufactures data have also been used to examine the effect of product market factors on a wide spectrum of finance issues: corporate takeover decisions (Eckbo 1985 (Eckbo , 1992 Maksimovic and Phillips 2001) , capital structure decisions (Phillips 1995; Kovenock and Phillips 1997; Mackay and Phillips 2005; Campello 2006 ), corporate investment patterns (Akdogu and Mackay 2008) , chief executive officer (CEO) compensation contracts (Aggarwal and Samwick 1999) , and risk management decisions (Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell 2007) . These studies argue that it is preferable to use concentration measures calculated by the U.S. Census because the measures based on Compustat data are subject to measurement error due to the exclusion of private firms, which often account for a nonnegligible percentage of industry sales. Phillips (2005, p. 1439) point out that because industry concentration measures calculated by the U.S. Census are used by regulatory agencies such as the Department of Justice, these measures are likely to be the most appropriate to study product market issues.
Our empirical evidence indicates that Compustat-based industry concentration measures are poor proxies for actual industry concentration. The correlation between the Compustat and U.S. Census-based Herfindahl indexes is only 13%. Moreover, U.S. Census-based concentration measures are positively related to industry price-cost margins and to firm size measures such as net sales, total assets, and market capitalization. However, these relations are not obtained using Compustat-based industry concentration measures. Further, we show that the total number of private and public firms in an industry markedly drops between the highest and lowest quintiles of U.S. Census-based industry concentration measures. In contrast, this number changes very little if Compustat-based industry concentration measures are used instead. Thus, only when U.S. Census-based industry concentration measures are used are the results consistent with theoretical predictions that more-concentrated industries that should be more oligopolistic are populated by fewer and larger firms that enjoy higher price-cost margins due to their greater market power.
Next, we use the U.S. Census data to reexamine several important results obtained in prior studies that use Compustat-based industry concentration measures. First, we consider the Hou and Robinson (2006) finding that firms in more-concentrated industries earn lower future stock returns. They argue that their results indicate that barriers to entry in highly concentrated industries insulate firms from undiversifiable distress risk, which is priced in equity returns. Hou and Robinson (2006) also report that firms in less-concentrated industries spend more on research and development. They contend that this result supports the Schumpeter (1912) proposition that innovation, which is a form of creative destruction, is more likely to occur in competitive industries.
1 Also, they posit that higher innovation risk in less-concentrated industries contributes to the higher cost of equity capital in such industries. In contrast, we document that industry concentration measures calculated by the U.S. Census are not related to future stock returns. Further, we find that the U.S. Census measures are positively rather than negatively associated with research and development expenses. These differences in results are not driven by our sample being confined to the manufacturing sector, because using Compustat-based industry concentration measures and limiting our analysis to this sector, we are able to replicate the Hou and Robinson (2006) findings.
Second, we reexamine the Lang and Stulz (1992) result that the effect of bankruptcy announcements on the equity values of competitors is more positive in more-concentrated industries and that this effect is amplified in industries with low leverage. Lang and Stulz (1992) argue that in industries that are more concentrated and have lower leverage, competitors are more likely to benefit from the difficulties faced by a bankrupt firm. We obtain the same results as in Lang and Stulz (1992) with our sample of manufacturing firms, when we use Compustat-based industry concentration measures. However, using U.S. Census-based industry concentration measures, we are unable to replicate the Lang and Stulz (1992) findings.
Third, we reexamine the Harris (1998) result that firms are less likely to provide segment disclosures for operations in more-concentrated industries, measured using Compustat data. She argues that to protect their abnormal profits and market share, firms in less-competitive industries are less likely to disclose commercially valuable information to competitors. We obtain the same results as in Harris (1998) with our sample of manufacturing firms, when we use Compustat-based industry concentration measures. However, we find that the decision to provide segment disclosures for operations in a particular industry is not associated with the U.S. Census-based industry concentration measures of that industry.
Finally, we consider the Defond and Park (1999) result that CEO turnover is negatively associated with Compustat-based industry concentration measures. They argue that in more-competitive industries in which there is greater homogeneity across firms and in which CEOs are likely to have more peers, it is easier to identify and replace poorly performing CEOs. We obtain results similar to those in Defond and Park (1999) with our sample of manufacturing firms when we use Compustat-based industry concentration measures. However, we find an insignificant relationship between CEO turnover and U.S. Census-based industry concentration measures.
Our finding that using U.S. Census-based industry concentration measures we are unable to replicate the Hou and Robinson (2006) ; Lang and Stulz (1992) ; Harris (1998); and Defond and Park (1999) results suggests that Compustatbased industry concentration measures capture other industry characteristics that happen to be correlated with the dependent variables of these studies. To provide evidence on this issue, we examine what drives the Hou and Robinson (2006) result that Compustat-based industry concentration measures are negatively related to future stock returns and the Harris (1998) finding that firms are less likely to provide segment disclosures for operations in industries with higher values for Compustat-based measures.
We find that Compustat-based industry concentration measures are significantly negatively related to the change in industry shipments reported by the Census of Manufactures during the prior five years. However, U.S. Censusbased industry concentration measures are not related to past shipment growth. Thus, for some reason other than the actual concentration of an industry, industries with high Compustat-based measures experience poor growth in the recent past. An explanation for these findings is that a declining industry is left with only a few large, public firms relative to private firms. Consequently, there are only a few companies in the Compustat database for the industry, and this results in high Compustat-based industry concentration values. Consistent with this explanation, we find a significant negative relationship between the Compustat-based industry concentration measures and the change over the prior five years in the number of firms in an industry included in both the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat databases.
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Our finding that industries with high Compustat-based industry concentration measures tend to be declining industries explains why these industries spend less on research and development, as reported in Hou and Robinson (2006) and confirmed in our study. Given that prior work suggests that firms that spend more on research and development have higher future stock returns (e.g., Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis 2001; Chambers, Jennings, and Thompson 2002; Eberhart, Maxwell, and Siddique 2004) , we examine whether the association between Compustat-based industry concentration measures and future stock returns is sensitive to controlling for research and development expenses. After controlling for current research and development expenses, which we find are positively related to future stock returns, the negative association between Compustat-based industry concentration measures and future stock returns becomes insignificant. This finding suggests that the negative relationship between research and development expenses and Compustat-based industry concentration measures drives the negative association between these measures and future stock returns.
Next, we show that after controlling for prior growth in industry shipments, the Harris (1998) documented negative relationship between a firm's decision to provide segment disclosures of its operations in an industry and the Compustatbased concentration measures of that industry becomes insignificant. Further, we find that a firm's decision to provide segment disclosures for its operations in an industry is positively related to that industry's prior shipment growth. The latter result is consistent with the Miller (2002) and Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki (forthcoming) evidence that firms with weak (strong) prior operating performance provide less (more) informative disclosures. Overall, these findings suggest that the Harris (1998) result is driven by Compustat-based industry concentration measures proxying for the prior performance of a firm in one of its segments that in turn determines the firm's decision to provide a separate disclosure for that segment.
Our study makes the following contributions. First, we document that Compustat-based industry concentration measures, which exclude data on private firms, are poor measures of actual industry concentration. Second, we show that researchers who use Compustat data to construct industry concentration measures can arrive at results that lead to incorrect conclusions. Finally, our findings suggest that the significant results obtained in prior studies that use Compustat-based industry concentration measures could be due to these measures proxying for other industry characteristics that are correlated with the dependent variables of these studies.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the Compustat-and U.S. Census-based industry concentration measures used in the study. Section 2 provides evidence that indicates that Compustat-based industry concentration measures are poor proxies for actual industry concentration. Section 3 reexamines results of four prior studies that use Compustat-based industry concentration measures. Section 4 concludes.
Description of Compustat-and U.S. Census-based industry concentration measures

Compustat-based industry concentration measures
Compustat-based industry concentration measures are calculated using the sales data of firms included in the Compustat database. Because Compustat excludes private firms, Compustat-based industry concentration measures can potentially provide an inaccurate picture of the actual degree of concentration in an industry. In particular, in industries in which private firms account for a nonnegligible percentage of industry sales, it is problematic to rely on data that exclude these firms (Hay and Morris 1991, p. 210) . However, there are two advantages of using Compustat data to construct industry construction measures. First, such measures can easily be calculated by extracting from Compustat total sales for each firm in a particular industry. Therefore, they can provide a long and continuous time series of concentration measures. Second, using the Compustat database to calculate industry concentration measures allows researchers to construct these measures for a wide spectrum of industries. The Compustat-based Herfindahl index is calculated by adding the squares of the sales market shares of all the firms in an industry that have sales data on Compustat. Similarly, the Compustat-based four-firm ratio is calculated by adding the sales market shares of the four largest firms in an industry in terms of market share. We refer to the Compustat-based Herfindahl index and four-firm ratio as HI-Compustat and FFR-Compustat.
For the univariate results presented in this and the second section of the article, HI-Compustat and FFR-Compustat are calculated in a manner similar to that in Hou and Robinson (2006) . HI-Compustat and FFR-Compustat are calculated using the sales market shares of all the firms in an industry with sales data on Compustat and are averaged over the past three years. Industry is defined using historical CRSP Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. 3, 4 For the reexamination of the Hou and Robinson (2006) ; Lang and Stulz (1992) ; Harris (1998); and Defond and Park (1999) results, we calculate Compustatbased industry concentration measures using the methodology employed by the specific study.
U.S. Census-based industry concentration measures
The Census of Manufactures publications provided by the U.S. Census Bureau report concentration ratios for hundreds of industries in the manufacturing sector. We hand-collect data on the U.S. Census-based Herfindahl index and four-firm concentration ratio from Census of Manufactures publications for the years 1963, 1966, 1967, 1970, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002 . The data are for four-digit SIC industries (SIC codes between 2000 and 3999) for the years 1963-1992 and for six-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) industries (NAICS codes between 311111 and 339999) for the years 1997 and 2002. Kahle and Walkling (1996) report that over long sample periods there are advantages to using historical CRSP SIC codes instead of Compustat SIC codes. Further, because over the past fifty years the U.S. Census Bureau has revised the SIC system a number of times, it is advantageous to use historical CRSP SIC codes when constructing Compustat-based industry concentration measures. 4 Most work that uses Compustat-or U.S. Census-based industry concentration measures assumes that a firm competes in only the industry represented by the industry classification code assigned to the firm. Because the aim of this article is to compare results obtained with these two types of industry concentration measures, we make the same assumption.
Unlike Compustat-based industry concentration measures, U.S. Censusbased measures are constructed using data from all public and private firms in an industry and hence should better capture actual industry concentration. The use of U.S. Census-based measures by government regulatory agencies suggests that these measures should be quite reliable. For instance, these measures are often used by the Federal Trade Commission when it decides whether to challenge mergers on antitrust grounds. Another factor that suggests the U.S. Census-based industry concentration measures should be reliable is that all firms in the United States are required by federal law to respond to U.S. Census surveys (under Title 13 of the U.S. code). Further, Sections 213 and 224 of Title 13 of the U.S. code state that employees of the U.S. Census who collect data on its behalf and who knowingly furnish false information are subject to imprisonment and that agents of companies who willfully provide false answers to questions about their company are subject to hefty fines.
The Census of Manufactures calculates the Herfindahl index of an industry as the sum of the squares of the individual company market shares of all the companies in an industry or the fifty largest companies in the industry, whichever is lower. The four-firm ratio of an industry is the sum of the market shares of the four largest firms in the industry in terms of market share. We refer to these measures as HI-Census and FFR-Census, respectively.
The Census of Manufactures is published only during years when a U.S. Census takes place. We use the U.S. Census data for a given year as a proxy for industry concentration not only for that year but also for the one or two years immediately before and after it. This approach is similar to that used in several prior studies (e.g., Aggarwal and Samwick 1999; MacKay and Phillips 2005; Campello 2006; Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell 2007) . (Chevalier 1995a (Chevalier , 1995b Chevalier and Scharfstein 1996) , the relationship between industry concentration (collected from the American Trucking Association) and firm survival after deregulation of the trucking industry (Zingales 1998) , and how industry concentration (collected from Discount Merchandiser) interacts with ownership structure, capital structure, and corporate focus in the discount department industries (Khanna and Tice 2000) . 1963 1963-1964 1966 1965-1966 1967 1967-1968 1970 1969-1970 1972 1971-1974 1977 1975-1979 1982 1980-1984 1987 1985-1989 1992 1990-1994 1997 1995-1999 2002 2000-2005 The Census of Manufactures is published by the U.S. Census Bureau. 6,7 To calculate FFR-Census for four-digit SIC industries using FFR-Census of component six-digit NAICS industries, we use an approximation method. We first determine the component six-digit NAICS industry of a broader four-digit SIC industry that has the largest value for the sales of its top four firms. Next, we divide the sales of the top four firms of this six-digit NAICS industry by the total sales of all the component six-digit NAICS industries within the broader four-digit SIC industry. These results suggest that the exclusion of data on private firms not only leads to large differences between Compustat-and U.S. Census-based concentration measures but also leads to a low correlation between the two types of measures. Next, we determine the relation of industry markups with HI-Census and HI-Compustat. Industry markups represent average price-cost margins in an industry. Industrial organization theory predicts that in more-concentrated industries there is less intense competition and price is consequently set further away from marginal cost. Thus, a positive relation is expected between industry concentration and price-cost margins. We follow Allayannis and Ihrig (2001) and calculate industry markups using aggregate industry-level data from Annual Survey of Manufacturers publications. We also use their definition for industry markups, which is as follows:
Evidence that Compustat-based industry concentration measures are poor proxies for actual industry concentration
We collect annual industry data at the four-digit SIC level from 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996 Annual Survey of Manufacturers publications and calculate industry markups for the period from 1993 to 1996. For this period, we form quintiles based on HI-Census and HI-Compustat and calculate median industry markups for each of the quintiles.
The results in panel A of Table 3 show that industry markups are higher in industries with higher values of HI-Census. In industries that are in the highest quintile of HI-Census, industry markups are almost 25% larger than they are in industries in the lowest quintile of HI-Census. In contrast, panel B shows that industry markups are not systematically related to HI-Compustat. These results suggest that U.S. Census-based measures are better proxies for actual industry concentration than are Compustat-based measures.
Next, we compute for each quintile the median number of public and private firms per industry, based on U.S. Census data, Nfirms-Census. Panel A reports that for HI-Census-based quintiles 1 and 5, the median Nfirms-Census values are 1385 and 88, respectively. Panel B shows that for HI-Compustat-based The Market Capitalization is defined as market value of equity in millions at the end of year t. Book Assets is the book value of total assets at the end of year t. Net Sales, Market Capitalization, and Book Assets are inflation adjusted. Descriptive statistics are calculated by pooling firm-year observations. quintiles 1 and 5, the median Nfirms-Census values are 535 and 211, respectively. Thus, the difference in Nfirms-Census between quintiles 1 and 5 is far greater when the quintiles are based on HI-Census than when they are based on HI-Compustat. Given that more-concentrated industries, which are presumably less competitive, should be populated with a smaller number of firms, the above results further suggest that HI-Census is a better indicator of true industry concentration than is HI-Compustat. Additionally, Table 3 presents for each of the quintiles the median percentage of firms in an industry reported by the U.S. Census that are included on CRSP and Compustat (Nfirms-Compustat as a percentage of Nfirms-Census). Panel A shows that this percentage increases substantially from HI-Census-based quintiles 1-5. This is consistent with the expectation that in more-concentrated industries there should be a greater percentage of large, public firms, the type that are likely to be included on both CRSP and Compustat. Panel B, in contrast, shows that the percentage of U.S. Census firms that are included on CRSP and Compustat does not increase from HI-Compustat-based quintiles 1-5. Instead, this percentage decreases over these quintiles. This finding provides further support to the notion that Compustat-based industry concentration measures are poor indicators of actual industry concentration.
Next, we examine how firm size varies across quintiles sorted by HI-Census and by HI-Compustat. We consider three measures of size: net sales, market capitalization, and book assets. Each of these measures is inflation adjusted. Data for these variables are obtained from Compustat. Thus, the median values of each of the firm size variables reported in Table 3 are not the medians across all U.S. Census firms but are the medians for the subset of firms covered by the CRSP and Compustat databases. Consequently, inferences based on these variables should be viewed with caution. Panel A shows that median net sales (market capitalization, book assets) for firms in the HI-Census-based quintiles 1 and 5 are $217m ($94m, $152m) and $911m ($651m, $691m), respectively. These results indicate that, consistent with theoretical expectations, in lessconcentrated industries, which are likely to be more competitive, firm size is substantially smaller than it is in highly concentrated less-competitive industries. Panel B shows that median net sales (market capitalization, book assets) for firms in HI-Compustat-based quintiles 1 and 5 are $388m ($200m, $328m) and $304m ($187m, $219m), respectively. These findings show that firm size is actually smaller in the highest HI-Compustat quintile than it is in the lowest quintile, further suggesting that the Compustat-based industry concentration measures are poor proxies for actual industry concentration. (1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002) .
Compustat-based industry concentration measures are not good proxies for actual industry concentration.
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In Table 5 , we report average values of HI-Census and HI-Compustat for four-digit SIC industries within particular two-digit SIC industry groups. These data allow us to provide information on what the typical Herfindahl index value is for a four-digit SIC industry within a broader two-digit SIC industry. Also, this way of reporting our findings makes it easier to comprehend the data given the large number of four-digit SIC industries within the manufacturing sector. The industries are listed in ascending order of HI-Census. There is a large difference between HI-Census and HI-Compustat for every industry. Further, our results show that although HI-Census increases significantly as one moves from less-to more-concentrated industries based on this measure, there is no systematic variation in HI-Compustat along these industries, reflecting the low correlation between the two measures.
Reexamination of results obtained in prior studies that use Compustat-based industry concentration measures
Results that we have presented so far suggest that U.S. Census-based industry concentration measures are superior to Compustat-based industry concentration measures in measuring actual industry concentration and that there is a very low correlation between the two measures. It is therefore important to examine whether the results of prior empirical studies that use Compustat-based industry concentration measures are robust to the use of U.S. Census-based industry concentration measures. We reexamine the results in Hou and Robinson (2006) ; Lang and Stulz (1992) ; Harris (1998); and Defond and Park (1999) . We reexamine these four papers for the following reasons. First, we are able to collect the necessary data to replicate these studies. Second, the issues addressed in these studies are from four different finance-related areas: asset pricing, capital structure, corporate disclosure policy, and corporate governance. Hou and Robinson (2006) find that firms in more-concentrated industries earn lower future stock returns. They argue that barriers to entry in highly concentrated industries insulate firms from undiversifiable distress risk, which is priced in equity returns. We examine the sensitivity of their results to using U.S. Table 1 , the earliest year to which we can apply these data is 1980, we study the period from 1980 to 2001. Also, data on HI-Census are available only for manufacturing firms. So that we can make better comparisons, we examine only manufacturing firms when estimating results with the HI-Compustat measure.
Hou and Robinson (2006)
The regression results in the first column of Table 6 document a significant negative relationship between HI-Compustat and future stock returns. This result is similar to that reported in Hou and Robinson (2006) and is the basis of their conclusion that firms in more-concentrated industries earn lower returns four-digit SIC industry has the largest sales as measured by the sales of its top four firms. Next, we divide the sales of the top four firms of this six-digit NAICS industry by the total sales of the firms in all the component six-digit NAICS industries within the broader four-digit SIC industry. FFR-Compustat is the sum of the market shares of the four largest firms in terms of market share in a CRSP four-digit SIC industry. A firm's market share is measured as sales divided by total sales of all CRSP firms in that industry that have sales data on Compustat. For each year t, FFR-Compustat is averaged over a three-year period from year t − 2 to year t. Ln(Market Capitalization) is defined as the natural logarithm of the market value of equity in millions at the end of year t. Ln(B/M) is defined as the natural logarithm of book value of equity divided by market value of equity at the end of year t. Momentum for each month is prior one-year stock returns. Beta is market model beta estimated using the prior thirty-six monthly equally weighted CRSP index returns. Leverage is defined as total debt divided by market value of total assets (i.e., market value of equity plus debt) at the end of year t and is trimmed at the 1% level. Time-series average values of the monthly regression coefficients are reported with time-series t-statistics in parentheses. * * * , * * , and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, for a two-tailed test.
because these industries are less risky. The second column of the table presents the regression results of the same model as in the first column, except that the three-digit SIC level HI-Compustat is replaced with the three-digit SIC level HI-Census. We find that future stock returns are not associated with HI-Census. Thus, this result does not support the Hou and Robinson (2006) conclusion that industry concentration is related to future stock returns.
The third and fourth columns of Table 6 provide results of regression models that are similar to the models in the first two columns of this table, except that the four-firm ratio is used as the measure of industry concentration rather than the Herfindahl index. This analysis provides evidence on the sensitivity of our conclusions to the use of an alternative definition of industry concentration. Another benefit of this analysis is that we have data on FFR-Census for the 1963-2001 period, which is the sample period used in Hou and Robinson (2006) . We use the four-firm ratio at the four-digit SIC level because FFRCensus is reported at the four-digit SIC level and converting this measure to the three-digit SIC level involves approximation. 11 The results show that FFRCompustat is significantly negatively associated with future stock returns. In contrast, there is no association between FFR-Census and future stock returns, further suggesting that the Hou and Robinson (2006) conclusion that industry concentration is related to future stock returns may not be valid.
12,13 Hou and Robinson (2006) also document that firms in less-concentrated industries have higher research and development expenses. They posit that this result is consistent with the Schumpeter (1912) proposition that innovation as a form of creative destruction is more likely to occur in competitive industries. Also, they argue that if innovation risk is priced into stock returns and this risk is higher in more-competitive industries, it contributes to the higher cost of equity capital in such industries.
We examine whether the relationship between industry concentration and research and development expenses is sensitive to using Compustat or U.S. Census data to measure industry concentration. The model we estimate is from panel B of Table 2 of Hou and Robinson (2006) , which relates industry concentration to certain industry characteristics. The dependent variables for the models in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 are HI-Compustat and HI-Census, and the sample period is 1980-2001. 11 Our results remain qualitatively the same when we use FFR-Compustat for three-digit industries and approximate FFR-Census for three-digit SIC industries, using a methodology similar to that discussed in Section 1.3 of the article. Further, if HI-Compustat and HI-Census are defined at the four-digit SIC level instead of the three-digit SIC level, as in the first two columns of Table 6 , the results remain qualitatively the same. We also examine whether our conclusions are sensitive to defining industry at the six-digit NAICS level. Since the U.S. Census measures for six-digit NAICS industries are available for 1997 and 2002 and we can apply these data for the period from 1995 to 2001, we use this sample period in our analysis. We continue to find that future stock returns are significantly negatively associated with HI-Compustat and FFR-Compustat, but are not significantly associated with HI-Census and FFR-Census. 12 We also examine the sensitivity of the results to applying a given year's U.S. Census industry concentration data to the surrounding one or two years. We estimate the models in columns 2 and 4 of Table 6 only for those years to which the U.S. Census data belong and find that the coefficients on HI-Census and FFR-Census remain insignificant. industry of a broader four-digit SIC industry has the largest sales as measured by the sales of its top four firms. Next, we divide the sales of the top four firms of this six-digit NAICS industry by the total sales of the firms in all the component six-digit NAICS industries within the broader four-digit SIC industry. FFR-Compustat is the sum of the market shares of the four largest firms in terms of market share in a CRSP four-digit SIC industry. A firm's market share is measured as sales divided by total sales of all CRSP firms in that industry that have sales data on Compustat. For each year t, FFR-Compustat is averaged over a three-year period from year t − 2 to year t. All independent variables are industry averages of firm-level characteristics. Ln(Market Capitalization) is defined as the natural logarithm of the market value of equity in millions at the end of year t. Ln(B/M) is defined as the natural logarithm of book value of equity divided by market value of equity at the end of year t. Beta is market model beta estimated using the prior thirty-six monthly equally weighted CRSP index returns. Leverage is defined as total debt divided by market value of total assets (i.e., market value of equity plus debt) at the end of year t. R&D expense/book assets, Earnings/book assets, and Dividends/book equity are as of year t and are trimmed at the 1% level. Leverage is also trimmed at the 1% level. Time-series average values of the monthly regression coefficients are reported with time-series t-statistics in parentheses. * * * , * * , and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, for a two-tailed test.
The first column of Table 7 shows the replication of the Hou and Robinson (2006) finding that HI-Compustat is significantly negatively associated with research and development expenses. The second column presents estimates of the model that replaces the dependent variable HI-Compustat with HI-Census. We find a significant positive association between HI-Census and research and development expenses. If U.S. Census-based industry concentration measures are more appropriate measures of actual industry concentration, then this result indicates that innovation risk is actually higher in more-concentrated industries. This finding is consistent with the claim made in Schumpeter (1942) that there is more innovation in less-competitive industries because firms in such industries can enjoy economic profits resulting from their innovation, instead of having these profits competed away. However, this finding is not supportive of the Hou and Robinson (2006) claim that higher innovation risk in less-concentrated industries raises the overall cost of capital in these industries.
There is another notable difference in the results in columns 1 and 2 in Table 7 . Similar to Hou and Robinson (2006) , we find a significant negative association between HI-Compustat and firm size. However, HI-Census is significantly positively associated with firm size. Given that more-concentrated industries are expected to have on average larger firms, these results provide further support to the arguments made in section 2 of the article that U.S. Census-based measures of industry concentration are more meaningful than are Compustatbased measures.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 present results of the models that use FFRCompustat and FFR-Census, respectively, as the dependent variables. Also, these results are for the longer sample period from 1963 to 2001, the sample period used in Hou and Robinson (2006) . The relations of FFR-Compustat and FFR-Census with research and development expenses and firm size are qualitatively the same as those reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 . Lang and Stulz (1992) examine the intra-industry effects of bankruptcy announcements. They show that in industries with high leverage that are less concentrated, there is a significant and important negative price reaction to a bankruptcy announcement in the industry. They argue that this price reaction reflects the loss experienced by other firms in the industry, because the announcement conveys information about lower future cash flows for these firms. They refer to this effect as a contagion effect. They also find that industries with low leverage that are more concentrated exhibit significantly positive price reactions to a bankruptcy announcement in the industry. They contend that this price reaction reflects the benefits to competitors that result from the difficulties faced by the bankrupt firm and refer to it as a competitive effect.
Lang and Stulz (1992)
We investigate whether the Lang and Stulz (1992) results, reported in their Tables 3 and 4 , are robust to the use of U.S. Census-based industry concentration measures. They examine fifty-nine bankruptcies from 1970 to 1989. Our sample of bankrupt firms comes from the current Altman-NYU Salomon Center Bankruptcy list, which is an updated version of the data used by Lang and Stulz (1992) . We examine eighty-six bankruptcies that took place in the manufacturing sector from 1980 to 2004. As in Lang and Stulz (1992) , we Leverage is the debt-to-total assets ratio. The numbers in parentheses are z-statistics and the numbers in square brackets are z-statistics for differences between subsamples. * * * , * * , and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, for a two-tailed test.
define industry using four-digit SIC codes and calculate announcement returns from days −5 to +5 relative to bankruptcy announcements. Panel A of Table 8 reports our replication of the Lang and Stulz (1992) univariate results. First, the announcement returns for portfolios of industry peers are significantly more negative in industries with leverage above the sample median. Second, the announcement returns are significantly more positive for industries with HI-Compustat values above the sample median. Third, for industries with high HI-Compustat and low leverage, the announcement returns are significantly positive (1.887%). Finally, for industries with high leverage and low HI-Compustat values, the announcement returns are significantly negative (−3.042%). These results are similar to those reported in Lang and Stulz (1992) . Panel B presents the results with HI-Compustat replaced with HICensus. None of the significant relationships involving industry concentration that are observed in panel A are found to be significant in panel B. Thus, results based on the U.S. Census-based industry concentration measures are not consistent with those reported in Lang and Stulz (1992) and do not support their conclusions. Lang and Stulz (1992) use multivariate regression models to control for other factors that might be related to the announcement returns. We reexamine their regression results and report our findings in Table 9 . The first four columns in this table present the results from estimating the four multivariate models of Table 4 of Lang and Stulz (1992) . In the first three models, the explanatory variables of interest are the three dummy variables representing high debt/high HI-Compustat, low debt/high HI-Compustat, and low debt/low HI-Compustat. Consistent with the Lang and Stulz (1992) results, in all three models the coefficients on the dummy variable representing low debt/high HI-Compustat are positive and significant. They conclude that this result reflects the competitive effect. The coefficients on the other variables in these models are also similar to those in Lang and Stulz (1992) . In column 4, the dummy variables are replaced by HI-Compustat and leverage. Once again, consistent with the Lang and Stulz (1992) results, the coefficient on HI-Compustat is positive and significant, and the coefficient on leverage is insignificant. The coefficients on the remaining variables are also consistent with Lang and Stulz (1992) .
Columns 5-8 of Table 9 present results from estimating the announcement return models after replacing HI-Compustat with HI-Census. In columns 5-7, the coefficient on the dummy variable representing low debt/high HI-Census is not significant. Also in the last column, the coefficient on HI-Census is not significant. In sum, the Lang and Stulz (1992) results and conclusions are not robust to using U.S. Census-based industry concentration measures instead of Compustat-based measures. Harris (1998) shows that firms are less likely to disclose separate segment information for operations in more-concentrated industries. She argues that firms behave in this manner to protect the abnormal profits and market shares related to their operations. She uses Compustat-based industry concentration measures in her empirical analyses. We reexamine the sensitivity of her results to using U.S. Census-based industry concentration measures. Specifically, we reestimate the multivariate logit model in her Table 3 on a sample of manufacturing firms. To create the dependent variable in these models, we follow Table 9 Weighted least squares regressions of industry portfolio market model cumulative residuals at bankruptcy announcements on industry characteristics Table 8 . Returns correlation is the correlation between the industry portfolio and the bankrupt firm returns for the year preceding the announcement. Leverage is the average debt-to-total assets ratio in a firm's industry. Log of average price is the natural logarithm of average stock price in a firm's industry. Distress cumulative return is the industry portfolio cumulative return in excess of the market return from five days before the first distress announcement to five days before the bankruptcy announcement. Predistress cumulated return is the industry portfolio cumulative return in excess of the market return from 800 to 50 days before the first distress announcement. As in Lang and Stulz (1992) , we identify first distress announcements using the methodology employed by Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) . t-statistics are in parentheses. * * * , * * , and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, for a two-tailed test.
Harris (1998)
her approach and use the Compustat Multiple SICs Tape, which reports all the SIC codes for a firm in a given year. As in Harris (1998) , we compare these SICs to those appearing in the Compustat Industry Segment File, which reports the segments actually disclosed in a firm's annual report. If a three-digit SIC in which a firm has operations is reported as a primary or secondary SIC for one of the firm's business segments, the dependent variable takes a value of 1; otherwise, the dependent variable equals 0. This definition allows for multiple firm-industry observations in a given year. The Compustat Multiple SICs Tape was discontinued in 1998. However, we were able to locate the 1997 Compustat Multiple SICs Tape and we used it in our analysis. This tape allows us to study the period from 1995 to 1997 rather than the period from 1987 to 1991 studied by Harris (1998) . We do not study the years examined in Harris (1998) because we have data for the SIC codes in which a firm has operations only for 1997. Table 10 reports the results of our logit regressions. The model in the first three columns of the table uses three-digit SIC level HI-Compustat as the measure of industry concentration, although Harris (1998) measures industry concentration as FFR-Compustat at the three-digit SIC level. Our reason for using HI-Compustat as an explanatory variable instead of FFR-Compustat in the regression models is that the 1997 Census of Manufactures reports concentration measures at the six-digit NAICS level, and it is possible to use these data to calculate HI-Census precisely at the three-digit SIC level, whereas we can compute only approximate FFR-Census values for three-digit SIC industries.
14 The other explanatory variables in the model are the same as in Harris (1998) .
We follow Harris (1998) and report results for each of the sample years separately. The coefficients on HI-Compustat are negative and significant for each of the individual sample period years examined, consistent with the Harris (1998) results. However, in models 4-6 in Table 10 , in which we replace HICompustat with HI-Census, the coefficients on HI-Census are insignificant for each of the sample years. Thus, the Harris (1998) findings are sensitive to the use of the U.S. Census-based industry concentration measures in place of the Compustat-based measures.
Defond and Park (1999)
Finally, we reexamine the Defond and Park (1999) result that CEO turnover is negatively associated with industry concentration. They argue that in more competitive industries there is greater homogeneity across firms and CEOs are likely to have more peers, making it easier to identify and replace poorly performing CEOs. Defond and Park (1999) To determine what are the component six-digit NAICS industries of a broader three-digit SIC industry we use NAICS correspondence tables provided by the U.S. Census. ROA persistence represents the speed of adjustment for firm-level positive abnormal return on assets in industry j and is measured as in Harris (1998) as the slope coefficient B 2j from the following regression model,
, where X ijt = the difference between firm i's ROA and mean ROA for its industry j, in year t, D n = 1 if X ijt−1 is less than or equal to zero, zero otherwise, and D p = 1 if X ijt −1 is greater than zero, zero otherwise. Earnings persistence across the SICs in which a firm operates is measured as the maximum value minus the minimum value of ROA persistence for a firm in the three-digit SICs in which the firm has operations during the current year. Median industry sales scaled by firm sales is measured as median sales for single-segment firms in a three-digit SIC industry j divided by firm i's sales. Number of SICs in which the firm operates is measured as the number of three-digit SIC industries in which the firm operates during the current year. Significance levels for Wald chi-square test statistics are in parentheses.
consists of firms in the Compact Disclosure database without any CEO turnover during their sample period. Their final sample has 301 firm-year observations with CEO turnovers and a control sample of 2429 firm-year observations with no CEO turnovers. For our sample, we consider manufacturing firms in the ExecuComp database over the period from 1994 to 2000 and treat firm-years for which the CEO for year t differs from the CEO for year t − 1 as a CEO turnover observation. Like Defond and Park (1999) , we consider all instances of CEO turnover regardless of the reason for the turnover. Our control sample consists of manufacturing firms included on the ExecuComp database that do not experience a CEO turnover during the period from 1994 to 2000. Our final sample consists of 203 firm-year observations with CEO turnovers and a control sample of 2267 firm-year observations with no CEO turnovers. We point out that we do not study a longer sample period so as to not impose the condition that control firms have no CEO turnover over this longer period. Also, we study the period from 1994 to 2000 rather than a more recent period so that our sample period can be closer in time to the Defond and Park (1999) sample period.
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The first three models in Table 11 report the results of replications of the three logit models of panel A of Table 4 of Defond and Park (1999) . The dependent variable takes a value of 1 for firm-year observations with a CEO turnover, and a value of 0 for firm-years belonging to the control sample. The main independent variable of interest is the square root of HI-Compustat calculated at the two-digit SIC level. All the models have the same set of control variables, except that the first model does not include analysts' earnings forecast errors, the second model does not include industry-relative earnings, and the third model includes both of these variables. The results in the first three columns of Table 11 show that there is a significantly negative association between CEO turnover and the square root of HI-Compustat, consistent with the Defond and Park (1999) results. The results for the control variables are also consistent with those in Defond and Park (1999) , except that our coefficients on analysts' earnings forecast errors are not statistically significant.
The models in the fourth to the sixth columns of Table 11 replace the square root of HI-Compustat, as an explanatory variable, with the square root of HI-Census calculated at the two-digit SIC level. We do not find significant associations between CEO turnover and the square root of HI-Census in any of the three models. Consequently, the Defond and Park (1999) The sample period is 1994-2000 and includes firms in the manufacturing sector (SIC codes between 2000 and 3999) covered by ExecuComp. We define our CEO turnover sample as firm-years for which the CEO for year t differs from the CEO for year t − 1. We define the control sample of firms that do not experience CEO turnover as firms that do not change their CEO over the 1994-2000 period. The dependent variable equals 1 if a firm-year is included in the CEO turnover sample and equals 0 if a firm-year is instead included in the control sample. HI-Compustat is the sum of the squares of the sales market shares of all firms in a CRSP two-digit SIC industry that have sales data on Compustat. For each year t, HI-Compustat is averaged over a five-year period from year t − 6 to year t − 1. HI-Census represents the Herfindahl index for two-digit SIC industries calculated using data collected from Census of Manufactures publications. Prior to 1997, the U.S. Census defines industry using four-digit SIC codes while from 1997 onward industry is defined using six-digit NAICS codes. To determine what are the component six-digit NAICS industries of a broader four-digit SIC industry, we use NAICS correspondence tables provided by the U.S. Census. Industry-relative earnings is net earnings scaled by assets during the fiscal year prior to the event year minus median net earnings for the firm's two-digit SIC industry. Analysts' earnings forecast errors is actual reported earnings scaled by assets immediately preceding the event year minus analysts' forecast of the fiscal year's earnings scaled by assets immediately preceding the event year, made nine months prior to the fiscal year end. Market-adjusted stock returns is the cumulative market-adjusted stock returns over twelve months prior to the CEO turnover for the CEO turnover sample. Market-adjusted stock returns for the control sample are computed over the twelve months prior to a randomly assigned pseudo-event month. Industry market-to-book ratio is the mean value of the market-to-book ratio in a two-digit SIC industry over the prior five years where the yearly industry market-to-book ratio is computed as the median value for the industry. Stock return volatility is the variance of returns during the twenty-four months prior to the event year. Industry-relative earnings, Analysts' earnings forecast errors, and Market-adjusted stock-returns are trimmed at the 1% level. Year dummies are included in all the models. t-statistics are in parentheses. * * * , * * , and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, for a two-tailed test.
What drives the results obtained with Compustat-based industry
concentration measures? Our results show that there is no significant relationship between U.S. Censusbased industry concentration measures and the dependent variables of the four studies we examined. An interesting question that arises is why the Compustatbased industry concentration measures have significant associations with the dependent variables of these studies. A likely explanation is that the Compustatbased measures capture some other industry characteristics that happen to be correlated with the dependent variables of these studies. To examine this possibility, we investigate what drives the Hou and Robinson (2006) finding that Compustat-based industry concentration measures are negatively related to future stock returns and the Harris (1998) result that firms are less likely to provide segment disclosures for operations in industries with higher values for Compustat-based concentration measures.
We find that Compustat-based industry concentration measures are related to industry decline. The Spearman and Pearson correlations between HICompustat and the change in industry shipments over the prior five years, as reported in the Census of Manufactures, are significantly negative (−0.122, p < 0.001, and −0.076, p < 0.001).
16,17 Likewise, the Spearman and Pearson correlations between HI-Compustat and the change over the prior five years in the number of firms per industry that have data available on CRSP and Compustat are negative and significant (−0.128, p < 0.001, and −0.135, p < 0.001). However, we do not find these significant relations when we use HI-Census instead of HI-Compustat. These results show that for some reason other than the actual concentration of an industry, industries with high Compustat-based concentration measures experience poor growth in the recent past, leaving them with only a few large, public companies relative to private companies. Consequently, the Compustat database covers only a few firms for these industries, which results in high values for the Compustat-based industry concentration measures.
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Our finding that industries with high values for Compustat-based industry concentration measures are likely to be declining industries explains the result documented by Hou and Robinson (2006) and confirmed in our Table 7 16 Because U.S. Census data are not available every year, we apply a given year's U.S. Census data on shipment values to the one or two years surrounding that year, as is shown in Table 1 . 17 We also find significant negative Spearman and Pearson correlations between HI-Compustat and the change in industry shipments over the next five years, as reported by the Census of Manufactures (−0.100, p < 0.001, and −0.063, p < 0.001). These results suggest that industries with high Compustat-based concentration measures also exhibit a decline in future years. However, we find that HI-Census is not related to the future change in industry shipments which indicates that actual industry concentration is not related to future industry decline. 18 We examine how the number of firms per four-digit SIC industry that have data available on CRSP and Compustat changes during the prior five years for industries in the highest quintile of HI-Compustat. We find that the average number of firms per industry drops from approximately five to three firms. This further suggests that industries with high values for Compustat-based industry concentration measures are likely to be declining industries. that such industries spend less on research and development.
19 Furthermore, prior studies (e.g., Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis 2001; Chambers, Jennings, and Thompson 2002; Eberhart, Maxwell, and Siddique 2004) provide evidence suggesting that firms that spend more on research and development have higher future stock returns. Thus, we investigate whether the association between Compustat-based industry concentration measures and future stock returns is robust to controlling for current research and development expenses. Specifically, we reestimate the relationship between Compustat-based industry concentration measures and future stock returns after adding R&D/book assets as an independent variable in the Table 6 models and report our findings in Table 12 . For this analysis, we use the sample period from 1963 to 2001, as in Hou and Robinson (2006) , since we are able to calculate HI-Compustat and FFR-Compustat over this period.
The first column in Table 12 reports a significantly negative relationship between future stock returns and HI-Compustat. The model in the second column of Table 12 includes R&D/book assets as an additional explanatory variable. Consistent with the findings of prior work, we find a significantly positive relationship between the R&D variable and future stock returns. Interestingly, after controlling for R&D/book assets, the association between future stock returns and HI-Compustat becomes insignificant. The third column of Table 12 documents a significantly negative relationship between future stock returns and FFR-Compustat for the period from 1963 to 2001. 20 However, the fourth model in Table 12 shows that after controlling for R&D/book assets, the association between future stock returns and FFR-Compustat becomes insignificant. In sum, the Table 12 results suggest that the negative relationship between research and development expenses and Compustat-based industry concentration measures drives the negative association between the Compustat-based measures and future stock returns.
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Next, we examine whether the correlation between prior shipment growth and Compustat-based industry concentration measures can explain the Harris (1998) result that firms are less likely to provide segment disclosures for operations in industries that have higher values for Compustat-based concentration measures. This examination is motivated by the Miller (2002) and Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki (forthcoming) studies, which show that firms with weak (strong) prior operating performance provide lower (higher) levels of disclosure. 22 Their findings suggest that the Harris (1998) result could be driven by Compustatbased industry concentration measures proxying for the prior operating performance of a firm in one of its industry segments, and that performance level in turn affecting the firm's decision to provide segment disclosures of its operations in that industry. Table 13 presents the results of our analysis of what drives the Harris (1998) result. The models in this table are the same as the first three models in Table  10 , except that we also include as a control variable the change in industry shipments over the prior five years, Shipment-Growth (−5,0) . After controlling for this variable, the relationship between firms' decisions to provide segment disclosures for their operations in a particular industry and HI-Compustat for that industry becomes insignificant. We also find a significant positive association between firms' decisions to provide segment disclosures of their operations in a particular industry and Shipment-Growth (−5,0) for that industry, consistent with the findings of Miller (2002) and Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki (forthcoming) that firms with weaker (stronger) prior operating performance provide less (more) informative disclosures. Overall, our findings suggest that the Harris (1998) result that firms are less likely to provide segment disclosures for operations in industries with higher HI-Compustat values is driven by the negative correlation between prior industry shipment growth and Compustatbased industry concentration measures. Finally, we note that our results in this section also suggest that the findings of the other two studies that we consider in this article, Lang and Stulz (1992) and Defond and Park (1999) , may also be driven by Compustat-based industry concentration measures proxying for other industry characteristics that are correlated with the dependent variables of these studies.
Conclusion
We compare the properties of industry concentration measures calculated with Compustat data, which cover only the public firms in an industry, with Census of Manufactures industry concentration measures, which are based on all public and private firms in an industry. We find that the correlation between the two measures is only 13%. Also, only for the U.S. Census measures do we find evidence consistent with theoretical predictions that more-concentrated industries, which should be more oligopolistic in nature, are populated by larger and fewer firms with higher price-cost margins. Given that Compustat-based industry concentration measures seem to be poor proxies for actual industry concentration, we examine whether results of empirical studies that use Compustat-based industry concentration measures are robust to the use of U.S. Census-based industry concentration measures. We reexamine the results found in Hou and Robinson (2006) ; Lang and Stulz (1992) ; Harris (1998); and Defond and Park (1999) . We show that Compustatbased industry concentration measures are significantly related to the dependent variables of each of these studies, consistent with the results of these studies. However, the U.S. Census-based industry concentration measures are not significantly related to any of these dependent variables. Further analysis of the Hou and Robinson (2006) and Harris (1998) findings suggests that the significant relations obtained in prior studies that use Compustat-based measures could be due to these measures proxying for other industry characteristics, such as industry decline or the associated decline in research and development spending, that are related to the dependent variables of these studies.
